黑洞社区

Grenfell Tower refurbishment fire safety consultant Exova gave 鈥渆ntirely inadequate鈥� advice to the project team carrying out the fatally flawed tower block upgrade at a time when there was confusion among contractors about safety requirements, the probe into 2017鈥檚 disaster has heard.

Inquiry expert witness Dr Barbara Lane told Wednesday鈥檚 hearing that Exova鈥檚 reports to project architect Studio E and project client Kensington and Chelsea Management Organisation failed to meet minimum standards in numerous respects. She said that the advice was professionally negligent at times.

Arup director Lane was asked to compile a report for the inquiry on the adequacy of the advice provided by Exova after it was appointed to the project in 2012 and tasked with producing a fire safety strategy for the existing building as well as one for the refurbishment.

Exova was not retained on the project after Rydon was appointed main contractor in 2014, although it continued to give advice on an ad-hoc basis.

But in her report, first submitted in May and updated last week, Lane鈥檚 overarching conclusions on the work that the specialist did undertake was that its advice was 鈥渆ntirely inadequate鈥�.

She said the consultant鈥檚 鈥減rimary failing鈥� was not looking properly at the risk of the spread of fire on external walls 鈥� a key factor on the 14 June 2017, when much of Grenfell was engulfed in flames and 72 lives were lost. The inquiry has already determined that the combustible aluminium composite material cladding and insulation added as part of the refurbishment were the reason that fire spread so rapidly across the outside of the tower.

In a day entirely devoted to the adequacy of Exova鈥檚 advice, Lane told yesterday鈥檚 hearing she stood by the view in her report that Exova鈥檚 failure to identify overcladding Grenfell was part of the refurbishment yet attesting the works would have 鈥渘o adverse effect鈥� on external fire spread 鈥� without actually analysing the proposals 鈥� was 鈥渧ery serious evidence of professional negligence鈥�.

Exova鈥檚 鈥渘o adverse effect鈥� suggestion was repeated in several generations of its fire safety strategy for the project, the last of which was published in November 2013. The assurance came with the rider that the view would be confirmed in a 鈥渇uture issue of the report鈥�. The future issue was never written.

Inquiry chair Sir Martin Moore-Bick asked Lane whether it wasn鈥檛 acceptable for a fire safety adviser to say that they didn鈥檛 have any information and would deal with particular issues later.

Lane agreed that it could be helpful for a fire safety adviser to record that they hadn鈥檛 been given any information about key elements of a project, potentially as a warning sign. But she said Exova鈥檚 assurances were misplaced.

鈥淚 don鈥檛 understand how you can give a view if you haven鈥檛 seen information,鈥� she said.

Lane accepted that a consultant would have been able to offer a view on the potential for fire to spread from one building to another without having seen detailed plans for a scheme, but not on the safety of the work itself.

She said she would have expected a reasonably competent fire safety engineer to know that the building was being over-clad and to set out as an 鈥渁bsolute bare minimum鈥� the statutory guidance for insulation, cavity barriers and the external surface.

Grenfell Inquiry counsel Kate Grange QC questioned Lane about Exova鈥檚 opening statement to the probe. It argued that reports for a specialist audience that included expert architects did not need advice on the performance requirements materials needed to meet 黑洞社区 Regulations in relation to fire spread.

鈥淚t鈥檚 no justification in my mind,鈥� Lane replied. 鈥淓xova wrote a scope of work, offered a detailed fire strategy, were appointed to do so, and B4 [of Approved Document B, which relates to the spread of fire] is one of the five significant requirements and it required information to be provided.

鈥淲ho gets to decide which parts of the 黑洞社区 Regulations are either irrelevant or so well known that you don鈥檛 even need to mention them in a detailed fire safety strategy? I don鈥檛 agree that is a valid justification whatsoever.鈥�

Grange said Exova had made the same suggestion of expertise in relation to refurbishment main contractor Rydon and facades specialist Harley, neither of which was described as needing a pointer to 黑洞社区 Regulations.

鈥淎s the evidence shows, that was also incorrect,鈥� Lane replied. 鈥淗arley asked some questions later and they needed to be answered. And they were not.鈥�

Grange asked Lane if it was generally the case at the time of the Grenfell refurbishment that specialist contractors needed help with interpreting the requirements in Approved Document B of the 黑洞社区 Regulations.

鈥淢y experience is that principal contractors and specialist cladding contractors needed assistance in understanding what the fire safety requirements were when they were going on to do their part of the job, which is the really detailed piece of work about materials and how to piece together their location,鈥� she said.

鈥淚f all the professionals on the design team were well aware of the 黑洞社区 Regulations, it doesn鈥檛 counterbalance or remove the duty that Exova had. They offered a detailed fire safety strategy and so a detailed fire safety strategy needed to be provided.鈥�

Industry uncertainty

Lane told Wednesday鈥檚 hearing that around the time of the Grenfell refurbishment there had been a significant amount of uncertainty about fire safety requirements in relation to materials. She said that by 2013 Arup was 鈥渟ufficiently worried about materials and certificates鈥� that it started to run in-house fire and facades seminars.

鈥淢y experience in 2013 was this whole issue of contractors and other parties beseeching me saying 鈥榖ut this document says it鈥檚 class 0 and therefore it鈥檚 acceptable鈥�,鈥� she said.

鈥淚 was involved in many conversations, even on our own projects at Arup, trying to explain the performance of insulation.鈥�

She added that requirements for cavity barriers to be placed around windows 鈥� which was another key safety shortfall on the Grenfell refurbishment 鈥� was also a common defect at the time.

Lane said that not all clients appointed a fire safety engineer on a project and that having chosen to appoint one, the team 鈥渟hould have had access to competent advice鈥�.

鈥淐rap condition worse鈥�

Elsewhere in her report, Lane said an internal email written by Exova consultant Cate Cooney that described aspects of the Grenfell refurbishment proposals as 鈥渕aking an existing crap condition worse鈥� had no justification. She said the exchange, which also talked about the need to 鈥渕assage鈥� elements of the project 鈥� and bluntly stated: 鈥渘o sprinklers wanted鈥� 鈥� raised serious concerns about the 鈥渁bsence of a recognition that protecting people is the primary goal of a fire safety engineer and the fire safety design solutions they are responsible for鈥�.

Lane鈥檚 report noted that the 鈥渃ulture鈥� the email displayed was not unique to Exova.

In her evidence yesterday, Lane also criticised Exova for failing to spend enough time surveying the condition of Grenfell Tower for its 鈥渆xisting building鈥� strategy.

She said the two hours spent by staff member James Lee at the building in May 2012 was 鈥渨holly insufficient鈥� for the task and suggested it should have been an all-day job for two people.

Lane also criticised assumptions made by Cooney in the existing building strategy that she wrote and which Lee鈥檚 site visit fed into.

Exova鈥檚 report said it had been assumed that Grenfell Tower had been constructed in compliance with the prevailing standards of the day, and that it had been maintained and that any amendments had been carried out with the approval of the regulating authority. Lane鈥檚 report said it was 鈥渨holly inappropriate鈥� for an existing building fire safety strategy to make such an assumption.

鈥淭he whole point of an existing fire safety strategy is to be clear on what is there,鈥� Lane told Wednesday鈥檚 hearing.

Grange asked Lane if it was wrong to assume that building works have been carried out to the appropriate standards. Lane replied: 鈥淵es鈥�.

The inquiry continues.