黑洞社区

Fire safety consultant Exova gave incorrect advice at key points when members of the Grenfell Tower refurbishment team were 鈥渞eaching for information鈥� on crucial details, the inquiry into 2017鈥檚 disaster has heard.

Expert witness Dr Barbara Lane said many of the queries were a consequence of Exova making no reference to 黑洞社区 Regulations requirements in relation to resisting the spread of fire on external walls in its fire safety strategy for the refurbishment.

She told the inquiry into the tower block fire, which claimed 72 lives, that the questions from project architect Studio E and facades specialist Harley ought to have spurred Exova associate Terry Ashton to update his strategy or at least flag its shortcomings.

The document said the refurbishment would have 鈥渘o adverse effect鈥� in relation to fire spread but that details would be confirmed in a future update. The update was never written.

Lane also challenged Exova鈥檚 suggestion that it had been 鈥渟ubstantially excluded鈥� from the project when Rydon became the design and build main contractor in 2014.

Giving evidence for a second day, Lane 鈥� who is a director at Arup 鈥� pointed to the significance of email exchanges in September 2014 and March 2015 when project team members were asking Ashton for advice on issues that are now known to have been central to the refurbishment鈥檚 fatal flaws.

In the September 2014 chain, Daniel Anketell Jones of Harley and Neil Crawford of Studio E sought guidance on the need for cavity barriers around windows as part of the refurbishment. They also queried the internal fire performance of the overcladding proposed for Grenfell.

Ashton responded that if the insulation set to go behind the cladding was combustible, cavity barriers would be required. Lane said the advice was incorrect.

鈥淚t doesn鈥檛 matter if the insulation is combustible or not, you are required to provide cavity barriers,鈥� she said.

鈥淗e needed to say: 鈥榊ou need cavity barriers on the floor lines and around the windows and the top of the wall鈥�. It doesn鈥檛 matter what insulation or anything else you鈥檝e selected for the columns or between he areas between the columns.鈥�

Hours later, Ashton was sent a datasheet for Celotex RS 5000 insulation which was part of the NBS specification for the Grenfell refurb and would be attached to the tower鈥檚 original concrete exterior but go behind the cladding panels.

According to the email trail identified by Lane, Anketell-Jones 鈥� who was Harley鈥檚 design manager at the time of the Grenfell project 鈥� asked Ashton whether it was right that cavity barriers would not be required for use with the Celotex insulation on the grounds that it was 鈥渃lass 0鈥�.

Ashton replied that not all products with a class 0 rating were non-combustible.

Lane said the exchange between Anketell-Jones, Crawford and Ashton was a 鈥渞eally important moment鈥� in her opinion.

鈥淵ou鈥檝e got professionals asking really specific questions about [part] B4 [of Approved Document B of the 黑洞社区 Regulations], as they鈥檙e entitled to do,鈥� she said. 鈥淭hey needed to hear that insulation needs to be a material of limited combustibility, which is not class 0, and they needed to hear, regardless, cavity barriers were required around the window.鈥�

She said Ashton should have at least warned the project team that using insulation with a class 0 test certificate 鈥� as the RS5000 had 鈥� on Grenfell Tower would be a fundamental breach of the 黑洞社区 Regulations.

Lane told the hearing that the exchanges with Studio E and Harley should have underscored that Exova鈥檚 incomplete fire safety strategy needed to be updated with the relevant information on resisting the spread of fire over external walls, which would have assisted with the queries.

鈥淭he design team clearly need some help,鈥� Lane said. 鈥淚t鈥檚 time to do the work to give them the guidance that they need.鈥�

Lane said at that point Ashton knew the insulation being proposed by the design team was not compliant with 黑洞社区 Regulations and should have known there were missing cavity barriers.

鈥淭here鈥檚 two red flags raised,鈥� she said. 鈥淚 think it鈥檚 now time to start worrying about what the external surface is, and how together the three things can comply with B4.鈥�

Lane subsequently pointed to email exchanges between Studio E, Harley and building control officers at the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea in March 2015 that showed that there was still a lack of clarity between the parties about whether firestops or cavity barriers were required.

She said: 鈥淲e now see entering into the narrative here a confusion about the difference between a firestop and a cavity barrier, and the need for someone who understands that fully, which is the fire safety engineer鈥檚 job, to explain what those two things are, what they鈥檙e for, and where they needed.鈥�

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry鈥檚 phase one report found that the aluminium composite material rainscreen panels with polyethylene cores fitted to the block as part of its upgrade had acted as a source of fuel and were the principal reason flames spread so quickly around the building. It said the polyisocyanurate (PIR) and phenolic foam insulation boards behind the ACM panels contributed to the rate and extent of vertical flame spread. Celotex RS5000 was PIR insulation.

Lane鈥檚 report to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry on the quality of Exova鈥檚 advice on the project concluded that it was 鈥渆ntirely inadequate鈥�. She said the most fundamental failing in relation to its fire safety strategy reports was the lack of any information on a performance standard for the building鈥檚 walls to adequately resist the spread of fire.

Lane told Wednesday鈥檚 hearing she stood by the view in her report that Exova鈥檚 failure to identify that the proposals involved overcladding Grenfell at the same time as asserting that the works would have 鈥渘o adverse effect鈥� on external fire spread was 鈥渧ery serious evidence of professional negligence鈥�.

Exova鈥檚 role 鈥榙id not end when Rydon became main contractor鈥�

Lane also disputed Exova鈥檚 opening-statement assertions to the inquiry that its 鈥渃ontinuing obligations鈥� on the project ended at around the time Rydon was appointed main contractor in 2014.

She said Exova鈥檚 suggestion that it had been 鈥渟ubstantially excluded鈥� from the project was a 鈥渧ery strong鈥� way to describe a reduced role.

Lane said the firm鈥檚 own fee proposal had suggested that it would provide advice on an ad-hoc basis as the project progressed beyond RIBA Stage E and that it had continued to answer questions from the project team and invoice for its work.

She said there was no evidence that client KCTMO had stood Exova down on the project when Rydon was appointed or of the firm鈥檚 claims its contractual obligations had effectively ended.

鈥淚 don鈥檛 understand why that is being said,鈥� she said.

Lane added: 鈥淚 see people contacting the fire safety engineer when they think they need some fire safety advice. That鈥檚 not the classification of exclusion in my mind.鈥�

Inquiry counsel Kate Grange QC asked Lane if it was the case that Exova had continued to respond to queries from the Grenfell Tower refurbishment team after Rydon was appointed but did so inadequately. 鈥淵es, that鈥檚 correct,鈥� Lane replied.

The inquiry continues.