黑洞社区

Decades of government failure, a slapdash construction culture and the dishonesty of building product manufacturers combined to kill 72 people on 14 June 2017.

This is the conclusion of the Phase 2 report of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, published this morning, which set out to determine the causes of the disaster and the role of construction firms, product manufacturers, government policy and others in its inception.

In its own words, the question the inquiry sought to answer was this: 鈥淗ow was it possible in 21st century London for a reinforced building, itself structurally impervious to fire, to be turned into a death trap that would enable fire to sweep through it in an uncontrollable way in a matter of a few hours despite what were thought to be effective regulations designed to prevent such an event?鈥�

While inquiry chair Martin Moore-Bick and his colleagues, the architect Thouria Istephan and housing expert Ali Akbor, found 鈥渘o simple answer鈥� to that question, their report, which spans seven volumes and runs to more than 1,600 pages, found no shortage of culpable actors. 

In a public statement introducing the report to the public, Moore-Bick said: 鈥淭he simple truth is that the deaths that occurred were all avoidable, and those who lived in the tower were badly failed over a number of years and in a number of different ways, by those who were responsible for ensuring the safety of the building and its occupants.鈥�

Those responsible for the disaster bore that responsibility 鈥渋n most cases, through incompetence, but in some cases through dishonesty and greed,鈥� he added.

In the run-up to its publication, the inquiry鈥檚 solicitors wrote to a total of 247 individuals and organisations to inform them of criticisms it was minded to make.

In government, the inquiry slammed 鈥渄ecades of failure鈥� to look carefully at the dangers of combustible materials and take action. 

Looking at the 2015/2016 refurbishment project which led to the installation of combustible cladding on the tower, it found carelessness and incompetence across the professional team and said similar poor practice was likely 鈥渨idespread鈥� in the construction industry at the time.

But perhaps its most damning indictment came in the section on the manufacturers of the rainscreen cladding panels and insulation products, who were accused of 鈥渟ystematic dishonesty鈥� in the way they had tested and marketed their products.

What consequences will come to those with responsibility for the disaster remains to be seen.

In accordance with the Inquiries Act 2005, the inquiry panel was prohibited from ruling on questions of legal liability, although the statute also provides that inquiries are 鈥渘ot to be inhibited in the discharge of our functions by any likelihood of liability being inferred from any facts we find or recommendations we make鈥�.

For their part, the Metropolitan Police and Crown Prosecution Service have already said that charges are unlikely to be brought until late 2026.

In the meantime, the sweeping recommendations for reform set out in the final section of Moore-Bick鈥檚 report will be its most significant legacy - if the government chooses to implement them.

While it acknowledged that actions had already been taken by government to 鈥渃ure many of the more glaring defects in the system鈥�, it nonetheless made a number of major recommendations for further reform. 

Perhaps the most consequential recommendation is to create a single construction regulator, endowed with vast oversight, which would report to a single secretary of state responsible for fire safety.

The inquiry took the view that, over the course of time, regulation of the construction industry had become 鈥渢oo complex and fragmented鈥�.

It wants to see a range of functions - including the regulation and testing of construction products, licensing of contractors for work on higher risk buildings and accreditation of fire risk assessors - to be brought under the remit of a new, single independent body, headed by an individual construction regulator.

It said the establishment of such a body would create 鈥渁 focal point in driving a much-needed change鈥� in the culture of the construction industry.

鈥淚t would enable information to be shared effectively between those responsible for different aspects of the industry and promote the exchange of ideas,鈥� it said.

While the inquiry noted the creation of a 黑洞社区 Safety Regulator in the aftermath of the disaster, it took the view that this body fell short of what was necessary to draw together responsibility for the 鈥渄ispersed鈥� set of functions relating to the construction industry. 

Its proposed regulator would report to a single secretary of state, with all functions relating to fire safety brought under this minister鈥檚 purview. Currently these functions are divided across the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government, the Home Office and the Department for Business and Trade.

This consolidation, the report said, would provide an environment in which 鈥渋nformation can be shared more quickly and more effectively鈥� and ensure that policy is developed 鈥渋n an holistic and coherent way鈥�.

The inquiry said a minister with such significant responsibilities relating to construction would 鈥渘eed to be able to turn for advice to someone who has a good working knowledge and practical experience of the construction industry鈥� and suggested the appointment of a chief construction adviser 鈥渨ith a sufficient budget and staff to provide advice on all matters affecting the construction industry鈥�.

This individual鈥檚 responsibilities would include: monitoring all aspects of the department鈥檚 work relating to the 黑洞社区 Regulations and statutory guidance; providing advice to the secretary of state on request; and bringing to the attention of the secretary of state any matters affecting the 黑洞社区 Regulations and statutory guidance or matters affecting the construction industry more generally of which the government should be aware.

The report also suggested an urgent review of the definition of a higher-risk building for the purposes of the 黑洞社区 Safety Act.

Currently, a building is considered higher-risk if it is at least 18m in height or if it has at least seven storeys and contains at least two residential units. 

The inquiry said that defining buildings as higher risk by reference to height alone was 鈥渆ssentially arbitrary in nature鈥� and therefore unsatisfactory.

鈥淢ore relevant is that nature of its use and, in particular, the likely presence of vulnerable people for whom evacuation in the event of a fire or other emergency would likely present difficulty,鈥� it added.