黑洞社区

Rydon鈥檚 senior manager on the Grenfell recladding job admitted the firm relied on specialist subcontractors and designers to fulfil its contractual obligation to ensure the project was safe.

Simon Lawrence also said Rydon lacked the in-house expertise to check the work of these sub-contractors and relied on third parties for this as well.

Ultimately it was relying on the local authority鈥檚 building control department to sign off the work, he said.

In evidence to the Grenfell Inquiry, Lawrence also admitted he did not know cavity barriers were needed around windows or that insulation on buildings above 18m had to be of 鈥渓imited combustibility鈥� 鈥� a term he said he had not fully understood at the time.

Lawrence, who became contract manager on the Grenfell refurbishment in spring 2014 for Rydon, the main contractor, made the admissions during his first day of evidence to the inquiry which restarted last week. He left Rydon in 2015 after more than a decade at the firm.

Lawrence, the first Rydon employee to give evidence, told the inquiry his responsibility was to deliver the project on time and on budget and also in line with the contract in terms of regulatory compliance.

Inquiry barrister Richard Millett QC took him through the contract, employer鈥檚 requirements and other regulatory and guidance documents at length. Lawrence agreed Rydon had a 鈥渄irect design responsibility鈥� to ensure all the work complied with relevant specifications, codes of practice and statutory requirements of the 黑洞社区 Regulations 2010 鈥� whether that work was carried out by its own staff or its subcontractors.

Asked whether Rydon had taken any steps to ensure its staff understood the regulations and requirements that it had promised the project would comply with, he said: 鈥淲e would all understand that in general terms, that there are 黑洞社区 Regulations that need to be complied with, but we wouldn鈥檛 know every sub-section.鈥�

Asked about his level of knowledge of product performance in the context of value engineering, he said: 鈥淲e would have known the overview, what the product did 鈥� for example what rainscreen cladding did 鈥� but not the in-depth detail of all the technical specifications behind it.鈥�

He was asked about several guidance documents he had not seen that relate to high-rise cladding projects, including the 黑洞社区 Control Alliance鈥檚 鈥淯se of Combustible Cladding Materials on Residential 黑洞社区s鈥�.

Millett asked him: 鈥淐an you account for being contract manager on the Grenfell Tower refurbishment which involved a major overclad of a high-rise residential building and yet not be familiar with this document?鈥�

Lawrence said: 鈥淭here are a lot of technical guidance and documents out there,鈥� pointing out elsewhere in his evidence that there are 鈥渉undreds of documents within a contract鈥� but that he was familiar with the general principles of not 鈥渂uilding a building that鈥檚, dare I say it, unsafe鈥�.

He said Rydon relied on its specialist subcontractors to be aware of such documents.

Millett asked: 鈥淗ow can you check whether they had used industry guidance such as this if you weren鈥檛 aware of it yourself?鈥�

Lawrence replied: 鈥淔irst, employing the right contractors and/or designers and ultimately, when it comes to compliance, we are looking for the building to be signed off, shall we say, for regulations by building control.鈥�

Millett asked what processes Rydon had to ensure materials used on their projects would not 鈥渞eadily support combustion鈥�. Lawrence replied: 鈥淚t would be using a competent design team and competent specialist contractors, backed up by building control.鈥�

Turning to requirements for fire stops, Millett asked: 鈥淲ere you at the time relying on others 鈥� specialist sub-contractors and design teams 鈥� to ensure that the design and construction complied with these specifications?鈥� Lawrence replied: 鈥淵es.鈥�

Turning to cladding and quoting BRE guidance on fire risks, Millett asked: 鈥淲ere there any processes in place at Rydon for ensuring the system wasn鈥檛 a fire risk after completion?鈥�

Lawrence said: 鈥淵es, because we employed specialist designers that should have been designing and installing to the regs. It was then checked by not only an independent clerk of works but it was also checked by building control.鈥� He agreed they relied on others but added that Rydon鈥檚 site managers would also check the building was built in accordance with the drawings.

Asked who would check, for example, whether cladding subcontractor Harley Facades鈥� work complied with Approved Document B on fire safety, Lawrence said: 鈥淢yself and the site team would ensure information was given to third parties who could check that compliance. That鈥檚 how we would manage it.鈥�

Millett clarified: 鈥淥ther people checked compliance, not Rydon?鈥� Lawrence responded: 鈥淲e employed third parties, yes, that were able to do that.鈥�

He was asked: 鈥淒oes that mean when Rydon was purporting to discharge its obligations to supervision which it owed to its client, it wasn鈥檛 actually supervising itself it was employing other people to perform its supervision for it?鈥�

Lawrence said: 鈥淚t would depend on what part of the works we鈥檙e talking about but by employing third-party specialists we would supervise them by making sure they carried their work out in programme and quality etc, but we would not be able to check to the technical detail, if that鈥檚 what you mean.鈥� They would also have meetings to check the build was progressing, he added.

When Millett鈥檚 questioning turned to Part B of the 黑洞社区 Regs and Approved Document B (ADB), Lawrence agreed with his suggestion that there was no 鈥淎DB bod in Rydon on this project鈥�.

He could not recall whether he had read ADB but said: 鈥淎s site management I would have regarded them as reference documents [to be referred to] as and when if we needed to investigate further鈥�.

He added: 鈥淲e wouldn鈥檛 as a site team be able to interpret these documents without help from others.鈥�

Millett established that Rydon did not have a matrix of responsibility for the Grenfell project. He asked: 鈥淗ow were you going to ensure each sub-contractor understood its responsibilities so there were no gaps in scope or deliverables?鈥�

Lawrence replied: 鈥淭he true answer is I don鈥檛 know. It would have been good to have a design responsibility matrix.鈥�

Elsewhere in his evidence, Lawrence said he wasn鈥檛 aware of the fire risks of using aluminium cladding, did not know that polyethylene was combustible or that ACM panels were also available with fire-retardant cores that were less combustible. The original plan was to use zinc but this was later switched to cheaper aluminium.

Lawrence also admitted: 鈥淚 wouldn鈥檛 have known that term, limited combustibility鈥�. He couldn鈥檛 say whether anyone at Rydon would have been familiar with it.

He also said he had not heard of a number of residential high-rise fires in the UK, Melbourne and UAE spanning 1991-2013. He said he did know about the fatal fire at Lakanal House in south London in 2009 and possibly that external spread of fire was a factor, but not about the involvement of cladding panels. Rydon did not, as far as he knew, have a training programme on such matters for its high-rise teams.

Later Millett asked if Rydon鈥檚 business model 鈥� as a main contractor whose works were carried out by subcontractors 鈥� was to provide management. Lawrence agreed.

In January鈥檚 opening submissions, Rydon鈥檚 barrister Marcus Taverner QC said the fact that it delegated tasks was not the same as ducking its responsibility.

The inquiry continues.