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Emails that appear to show the architect, contractor, fa莽ade specialist and fire engineer working on the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower knew that the cladding would fail in the event of a fire have been published by the public inquiry.

They were contained in evidence submitted this morning by insulation manufacturer Celotex as it sought to argue that the designers, contractor and consultants involved in the refurbishment bore responsibility for the performance of the cladding system in the blaze.

The emails refer to a debate between the parties and building control about the extent of fire stopping required to be situated in the cavity behind the fa莽ade to prevent unseen fire spread.

They include an internal email from Daniel Anketell-Jones at fa莽ade specialist Harley Facades to director Ray Bailey, in which he says: 鈥淭here is no point in 鈥榝ire stopping鈥�, as we all know; the ACM will be gone rather quickly in a fire!鈥�

In addition, Terry Ashton at fire engineer Exova told Neil Crawford at scheme architect Studio E: 鈥淚t is difficult to see how a fire-stop would stay in place in the event of a fire where external flaming occurred as this would cause the zinc cladding to fail.鈥� Crawford replied in agreement, adding: 鈥淢etal cladding always burns and falls off.鈥�

Celotex鈥檚 evidence also contains emails making similar points that were forwarded to Simon Lawrence, contracts manager at main contractor Rydon.

The existence of the email chain appears to contradict the assertions made by Studio E and Harley yesterday that they had no knowledge that the materials specified would burn so quickly in the event of a fire.

QC Craig Orr, presenting Celotex鈥檚 opening arguments to the second phase of the inquiry, which commenced yesterday, said: 鈥淭he stance which Rydon, Harley and Studio E have taken, in which they seek to blame Celotex鈥� is misplaced and unfounded.

鈥淎ll the evidence suggests that all of Studio E, Harley Facades and [main contractor] Rydon knew it would fail in the event of a fire, were external flaming to occur.鈥�

Orr said the email chain showed that the risk of a fire was expressly foreseen by the contractor and fire safety consultant working on the refurbishment, and that none of the firms involved in the refurbishment had explained how this knowledge could be reconciled with their responsibility to comply with the requirement in building regulations.

The legal requirement of building regulations is that buildings must adequately resist the spread of flame on their external surface, while the much-criticised guidance in Approved Document B that sits underneath this simply suggests ways this requirement can be achieved.

Harley鈥檚 evidence, published yesterday, stated that, at the time of the fire 鈥渢hey had no idea and no reason to believe that the principal materials used in the building envelope, namely the Reynobond Aluminium Composite Material (鈥淎CM鈥�) and the Celotex RS5000 insulation, would behave as they did in the event of a fire鈥�.

Harley pointed to marketing material from Celotex which explicitly advertised the use of the material used at Grenfell in buildings of more than 18 m high.

But Celotex said this morning marketing material and product certificates contained warnings that their use should be restricted to wall make-ups that had undergone full tests.

Studio E told the inquiry yesterday: 鈥淪tudio E did not have any knowledge at the time of the project that the products used on the tower were unsafe, and it could not reasonably have been expected to know that they were not safe.鈥�

It also blamed the regulatory system, saying it was 鈥渘ot fit for purpose鈥� and had permitted the routine use of unsafe cladding materials on buildings for many years.