Debbie Smith denied reaching agreement with senior official to withhold key details about cladding from minister in meeting three days after fire, inquiry hears

The former managing director of the 黑洞社区 Research Establishment (BRE) has denied reaching an agreement with a senior government official to withhold key details about the cladding on Grenfell tower in the days after the fire.

Debbie Smith told Thursday鈥檚 hearing of the Grenfell Inquiry that it 鈥渄idn鈥檛 occur at the time鈥 to mention that the ACM panels used on the tower had catastrophically failed a BRE fire test 16 years previously.

On 17 June 2017, three days after the Grenfell fire, Smith attended a meeting chaired by housing minister Alok Sharma called to inform the government鈥檚 immediate response.

By this time it was known that ACM panels had been installed as part of the tower鈥檚 cladding system.

Debbie Smith 3

Debbie Smith giving evidence to Thursday鈥檚 hearing

The inquiry has already heard that a series of tests on ACM in 2001, commissioned by the government and carried out by the BRE, had resulted in a 鈥渃atastrophic鈥 escalation of fire with the rig having to be extinguished five minutes into the 30-minute test after flames reached 65ft in height. 

But Smith did not mention the tests in the meeting, and did also not mention that she had known that ACM was being widely used on tall buildings prior to a 2006 revision of building regulations that restricted its use.

Counsel to the inquiry Richard Millett AC asked: 鈥淒uring this discussion or at any other time during this meeting, did you tell the minister or anybody else present that you yourself might have a very good idea as to the exact reasons for the speed of the spread of the fire, namely what the BRE had witnessed in the 2001鈥 tests?鈥

Smith replied: 鈥淣o, because that would not have been appropriate at that time, because an investigation was ongoing, and it would have been pure speculation, really.鈥

Millett said: 鈥淣o, it wouldn鈥檛, Dr Smith. It wouldn鈥檛 have been speculation. It was a fact, and it was a material fact, highly material to the very issue of the exact reasons for the speed of the spread of fire. 

鈥淭he BRE had conducted an experiment on [ACM] cladding and it had failed spectacularly. Why not tell the minister that that had happened and that the government had the records of that?鈥

Smith said that it 鈥渄idn鈥檛 occur at the time鈥, adding that the cladding system tested in 2001 was different to the one used on Grenfell tower and the results would not have been representative of the causes of the 2017 fire.

One of the aims of the meeting was to ascertain whether Grenfell tower was a one-off or if there were other buildings in the UK fitted with similar combustible materials.

But Smith admitted that she did not tell Sharma - who had been in his ministerial post for less than a week - that ACM had been permitted in high-rise buildings up to the 2006 revisions to building regulations because it could achieve the British fire rating of 鈥楥lass 0鈥.

Millett said: 鈥淲as it not relevant exactly in answer to the question for the minister to know that up until 2006 there was at the very least a real possibility of a legacy of buildings which had ACM with a polyethylene core on them, because the regulations at that stage permitted them?鈥

Smith replied: 鈥淥kay, but, I mean, what was being discussed was about finding facts and about knowing exactly the numbers and where they were.鈥 

鈥淚t would have been a direct answer to a direct question: is Grenfell a one-off? Why didn鈥檛 you say it can鈥檛 have been a one-off because the regulations were only tightened up in 2006 to ban all combustible materials from the external wall?鈥, Millett asked.

鈥淥kay, well, again, it鈥檚 not something that occurred to me at the time, given the nature of the discussions that were going on in that meeting,鈥 Smith said.

The BRE had also been warned in 2014 that ACM was still being widely used on high-rise buildings despite the 2006 revisions to building regulations because the text of the guidance was being misunderstood by many in the industry.

> Also read: Government may have understood 20 years ago Grenfell-style cladding was not suitable for high-rises, BRE says

The day before the meeting with Sharma, Smith had been travelling back to London from France on the Eurostar when she was emailed by Brian Martin, the senior civil servant responsible for fire safety regulations in buildings.

Smith sent Martin a message asking if she could call him. She told Millett that she could not remember if she had talked to the civil servant or what they had discussed if the call had taken place.

Millett asked: 鈥淒id you reach an agreement with Brian Martin before this meeting that you would speak only when spoken to and give away the barest minimum of information to the minister?鈥

鈥淎bsolutely not,鈥 Smith replied.

鈥淒id you reach an agreement with him that you wouldn鈥檛 mention the 2001 tests?鈥 Millett asked.

鈥淎bsolutely not,鈥 Smith replied. 

鈥淒id you reach an agreement with him that you wouldn鈥檛 tell the minister about the debate that had raged at least, as we鈥檝e seen, since July 2014 about the scope and ambit of [building regulations on combustible cladding]?鈥

鈥淣o, absolutely not,鈥 Smith replied.

Earlier in the day, Martin had approached the BRE asking for an 鈥渋ndependent expert鈥 to rebut a story in The Times which claimed that dangerous cladding had been compliant with official guidance.

Martin, who had sent an identical email to building control body the National House 黑洞社区 Council, had then informed Smith that he had 鈥渁greed with the Met Police鈥 that the expert could not be from BRE.

Asked why this agreement had been made, Smith said she did not know for certain, adding that she thought the BRE was being approached by the Met to assist in the investigation into the Grenfell fire.

The inquiry continues.