Following a turbulent 12 months of engineering delays, in-fighting and inadequate planning, Network Rail鈥檚 fortunes seem to have turned following George Osborne鈥檚 increase to capital spending and Sir Peter Hendy鈥檚 reconfigured spending programme. So has the company got away with it?

PA Images Network Rail

Brimming with the confidence of a man who had masterminded a startling election victory only six months earlier, George Osborne used last month鈥檚 Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) and Autumn Statement to tell the House of Commons he was the chancellor who could both balance Britain鈥檚 books and transform its infrastructure.

Continuing the focus on capital spend, Osborne announced both a 37% decrease in the Department for Transport鈥檚 (DfT) operational budget and a 50% increase in capital spending to 拢61bn. With a Cheshire Cat grin, Osborne could let rip with his second-favourite slogan: 鈥淔or we are the builders.鈥 (His favourite remains 鈥渓ong-term economic plan鈥.)

He added: 鈥淏y making the difficult decisions to save on day-to-day costs in departments, we can invest in the new roads, railways, science, flood defences and energy Britain needs.鈥

But railway spending has not always appeared so secure over the past 12 months. At times, it seemed that Network Rail, which runs and maintains 20,000 miles of track as well as 6,300 level crossings and 40,000 bridges and tunnels, was in real trouble.

Engineering overruns triggered chaotic scenes at Paddington, King鈥檚 Cross, and London Bridge. In February, Network Rail chief executive Mark Carne stunned DfT officials when he launched into the organisation by admitting that 鈥渟ometimes we let passengers down鈥.

Former Labour transport secretary Lord Andrew Adonis said Carne had performed a 鈥渟ystematic hatchet job鈥 on his own company. DfT officials grumbled that chairman Richard Parry-Jones had failed to control his chief executive, who only joined the organisation in 2014.

By summer, Parry-Jones was replaced by Transport for London Commissioner Sir Peter Hendy, who launched one of three separate reviews into Network Rail鈥檚 structure, spending plans, and future. There was a 拢2m fine for missing punctuality targets, former Eurostar boss Richard Brown was installed as a 鈥渟pecial director鈥 to report directly to transport secretary Patrick McLoughlin, and, most notoriously, two major electrification projects were put on hold because of budget-busting construction inflation.

But now Osborne鈥檚 warm words and the publication of Hendy鈥檚 report, which reconfigures Network Rail鈥檚 tight spending programme, alongside the CSR seems to have calmed nerves. Several rail sources use the same words: 鈥淣etwork Rail has got away with it.鈥

The Hendy Review

Network Rail is in year two of its latest five-year spending programme, Control Period 5 (CP5), but this was thrown into disarray when McLoughlin 鈥減aused鈥 those two electrification projects.

The cost of upgrading the Great Western Main Line between Cardiff and Maidenhead is now estimated to be 拢2.8bn, up from 拢1.6bn only a year ago - a rise described as 鈥渟taggering and unacceptable鈥 by the Commons鈥 Public Accounts Committee. The Transpennine electrification was beset by problems of accessing old infrastructure and the work needed reassessment.

PA Images Network Rail

Hendy鈥檚 review confirmed these two schemes would be delayed, and that several smaller projects 鈥渨here the scope was poorly defined from the outset鈥 had seen their costs increase greatly.

The review states: 鈥淔irstly, there was inadequate planning and scope definition of a number of projects in their early phases. Secondly, there was poor cost estimating, particularly on electrification projects.

鈥淣etwork Rail has not carried out any electrification of significance for 20 years, so there was limited information to support cost estimates. It is clear that some of Network Rail鈥檚 early cost estimates, particularly for electrification schemes, were inadequate.鈥

Its conclusions are a huge embarrassment to an austerity chancellor. The upshot is the cost of the CP5 programme will actually rise by 拢2.5bn, paid for by land sales and more borrowing, but it will still fail to deliver what was originally intended by the end of the period. As well as the electrification programmes, other jobs, such as the enlargement of Oxford station where there will be 3.3 million more passengers by 2026 compared with 2011, will be delayed into CP6.

A leading rail consultant says: 鈥淭he funding envelope isn鈥檛 reducing, but the amount of output we鈥檙e getting is going down. They鈥檒l just deliver less output for the same money in a fixed period of time.鈥

The source adds that engineering firms should be 鈥渞ubbing their hands鈥 because, coupled with HS2, there is plenty of work available, but it means they won鈥檛 have to find so much skilled labour to throw at electrification projects to get them finished quickly.

鈥淔rom an engineer鈥檚 point of view, the biggest problem they鈥檝e had is a lack of people,鈥 says the consultant. 鈥淚n a weird way this helps them.鈥

Hendy鈥檚 review points to the lack of signaling experts, particularly testers and data experts, as 鈥渁n area that poses risk to a number of projects and needs careful monitoring and management鈥.

McLoughlin was impressed by the 43-page report, telling Hendy in a signed letter: 鈥淣ot every project will go to plan. But we will see the job through.鈥

A senior rail executive says: 鈥淭his report has given Peter some breathing space, he鈥檚 got the time to come up with a more detailed plan. Peter needed some space to get Network Rail鈥檚 act together.

鈥淗ad the original scope of work been even attempted, Network Rail would have soon breached [its spending limits].鈥

By making decisions to save on day-to-day costs, we can invest in new roads, railways, science flood defences and energy britain needs

George Osborne, autumn statement

The politics of rail

But the executive also points out that Network Rail had lost its 鈥渇inancial rigour鈥. In the past, the organisation could borrow from the bond markets, underpinned by a government guarantee, to make up any finding shortfalls because it was, in effect, run as a private company despite state backing.

This changed in 2014, when Network Rail was brought back on to the government鈥檚 books to adhere to European accounting rules, bringing tens of billions of debt on to the government鈥檚 balance sheet.

A second report published last month by Dame Colette Bowe, which focused on what lessons could be learned from CP5鈥檚 poor planning, states: 鈥淲hilst not a cause of cost escalation, reclassification exposed a previous reliance by all parties on access to financing that was off government balance sheet as a means of managing financial overruns.鈥

Even before the reclassification, though, the previous chief executive, Sir David Higgins, had warned that the Office of Rail Regulation鈥檚 CP5 settlement for Network Rail of 拢38.5bn was 鈥渦nbalanced and therefore unrealistic鈥.

Bowe certainly alludes to the conflicts between ORR and Network Rail, as well the DfT, when she says: 鈥淭he definition of organisational responsibilities between the department, Network Rail and the ORR [鈥 were unclear, lacking the relentless focus and clarity required for the design and execution of a major infrastructure programme.鈥

Interestingly, there have been rumours that Bowe鈥檚 report was slightly revised after DfT officials were shocked at the level of criticism they received. True or not, the report is still critical and backs up another rail executive鈥檚 view that officials 鈥渄idn鈥檛 have the time or skills鈥 to oversee Network Rail when it was re-nationalised.

A number of rail executives and civil servants privately thought Higgins鈥 successor, Carne, might not have lasted in the role beyond summer, despite an impressive focus on health and safety. They were concerned the former Royal Dutch Shell executive鈥檚 talk of a 鈥渄igital railway鈥 was in danger of failing to address the more prosaic challenges of a beleaguered Victorian-era network.

Carne claimed technology could vastly improve Network Rail鈥檚 performance. In-cab signaling would see signaling failures reduced by 30% and trains running faster, he said.

鈥淐arne pushed too hard for a digital railway,鈥 says one insider. 鈥淣etwork Rail has got to go back to basics - the job is to patch up a railway that is 150 years old.

鈥淐arne came from oil, where the engineering is all about software and sonar. He wanted to change the engineering of Network Rail. That鈥檚 fine - as long as the trains are running on time and the engineering does the basics.鈥

PA Images Network Rail

The source believes that Network Rail should 鈥済ive the stations to someone else鈥. Network Rail owns and looks after 18 of the country鈥檚 biggest stations, including Birmingham New Street, Glasgow Central, and 10 in London, such as Cannon Street and Charing Cross.

The Treasury agrees and Osborne has asked officials to look into handing over the management of them to an outsourcing specialist, a developer, or possibly train companies that have experience of running smaller stations.

Officials also want Network Rail to let other companies run its telecoms, such as providing wi-fi to passengers, and energy supply, such as overhead cabling and distribution networks. KPMG has just been appointed to run a six-month review into the latter, which could be sold for an estimated 拢2bn.

This is on top of the 拢1.8bn that the DfT and Treasury is letting Network Rail raise from 鈥榥on-core assets鈥 to meet the rising costs of its programmes, including by selling retail units in its managed stations and depots.

Politically, Osborne needed to be able to tell parliament that Network Rail and, specifically, the Transpennine electrification between Manchester and York, were back on track because of his vision of a 鈥渘orthern powerhouse鈥.

That is the Chancellor鈥檚 third favourite slogan and is a vision of rebalancing the British economy away from its dependence on London.

This lacks detail at the moment, but ministers agree that it is dependent on improving public transport in the north. A source close to the DfT suggests that Osborne would have clamped down harder on spending more on fewer projects in CP5 had it not been for 鈥淥sborne鈥檚 commitment to the northern powerhouse鈥. 

Whatever the reason, Network Rail appears to have, at last, a viable plan, both in terms of its capital spending programme and the refocusing of the organisation on its traditional role as the country鈥檚 train track engineer.

If that plan doesn鈥檛 come off, though, Osborne鈥檚 claims of being George the Builder will be fatally undermined.