黑洞社区

Studio E should never have specified the insulation that was used in the Grenfell Tower refurbishment project, the inquiry has been told.

The practice鈥檚 confidence in Celotex RS5000 was 鈥渁n ongoing major failure on their part鈥� to understand 黑洞社区 Regulations, expert witness Paul Hyett said yesterday.

A 鈥渞easonably competent architect鈥� should have known PIR (polyisocyanurate) insulation was not compliant with Approved Document B (ADB) of the 黑洞社区 Regulations, he added.

Hyett, a former president of the RIBA, was giving evidence for the second day at the inquiry into the circumstances leading to the fire that claimed the lives of 72 people in 2017.

Inquiry barrister Richard Millett QC read from Hyett鈥檚 report to the inquiry which says: 鈥淐elotex 5000 did not meet any of the definitions for materials of limited combustibility as set out in Table A7 of ADB2.

鈥淪tudio E should not have specified an insulation product that did not carry proper certification as evidence of its suitability in meeting the guidelines of ADB2 and the requirements of the 黑洞社区 Regulations.鈥�

The same was true of Kingspan Kooltherm K15, another product considered for use in the refurbishment project on the 20-storey tower in North Kensington, he said.

In addition to the 黑洞社区 Regulations, the CWCT standard that Studio E included in its specification stated: 鈥淚nsulation in walls of buildings with a storey more than 18m above ground level should be of limited combustibility.鈥�

The only alternative route to compliance would have been a method such as full-scale testing which was never considered by the Grenfell project team.

Millett asked him: 鈥淒o you agree that, in the absence of any consideration of any of the other alternative routes to compliance鈥� quite simply PIR insulation and phenolic insulation should simply not have been considered at all by the design team or specified by Studio E?鈥�

Hyett replied: 鈥淐ertainly.鈥�

Hyett also said in his report: 鈥淪tudio E鈥檚 continued confidence in the Celotex RS5000 product, and the use of PIR insulation within the cladding system, represents an ongoing major failure on their part to understand both the requirements of the 黑洞社区 Regulations and the guidance given within ADB2 with respect to insulation in external walls.

鈥淭hat failure of understanding appears to have extended to both Harley (Mr D Anketell-Jones) and, surprisingly, Exova (Mr Ashton),鈥� he added referring to the specialist fa莽ade designer and fire consultant on the project.

Millett then read an extract from an email exchange in September 2014 between Neil Crawford of Studio E and Terry Ashton of fire safety consultant Exova in which the latter says: 鈥淚f the insulation in the cavities behind the rainscreen cladding is combustible you will need to provide cavity barrier as shown on your drawing鈥︹��

In his report, Hyett said he failed to understand how a fire specialist could be asking if the insulation was combustible when 鈥渉e should well know鈥� it is required to be of 鈥渓imited combustibility鈥�.

He added: 鈥淢r Ashton鈥檚 reply is astonishing, coming from an alleged expert in fire safety within construction. By stating, 鈥業f the insulation 鈥� is combustible鈥� he appears to be condoning an outright breach of ADB2 guidance under paragraph 12.7.鈥�

Crawford should have picked up on this and refused to accept Ashton鈥檚 advice, Hyett told the inquiry. Asked whether accepting the advice and not raising questions fell below the standard of the reasonably competent architect, Hyett replied: 鈥淵es, yes, yes.鈥�

Exova was not retained on the project after Rydon was appointed main contractor in March 2014, although it continued to give advice on an ad-hoc basis.

Ashton鈥檚 advice came post-novation in September 2014 but Hyett concluded that, as co-ordinating consultant, Crawford should still have insisted.

Hyett added: 鈥淚 cannot understand how an issue like this could have remained unresolved over such an extended period of time, and this goes to the heart of it, I think. An architect should grasp a nettle like this very, very firmly, and gather the people around the screen or the table and thrash it out.鈥�

The inquiry heard it was Max Fordham, the services engineer, which first suggested replacing Celotex RS5000 with the FR5000 variant that was ultimately installed in order to help meet the architect鈥檚 thermal performance aspirations and thickness requirements.

Hyett said Studio E could be 鈥減retty disappointed鈥� that Fordhams suggested a non-compliant material, describing it as a 鈥渃urveball鈥� but said it was ultimately the architect鈥檚 responsibility to satisfy itself of the compliance of the new proposal.

No contract: down tools

Earlier in the day, Millett asked Hyett what Studio E should have done when newly appointed main contractor Rydon started asking the practice for work without agreeing terms.

Hyett said: 鈥淭hey can down tools or, put another way, never pick the tools up. That would be a very good starting point.鈥�

He conceded that contracts might not be signed immediately but that there should be a 鈥渃lear indication to the architect that there is a defined scope of work, the fees are satisfactory and that things look good to go鈥�.

A contract was not signed until 2015, the inquiry has previously been told, about a year after Rydon won the tender.

Hyett said in a situation without a contract it would be 鈥渧ery risky鈥� for the architect to proceed as though they had been retained on a standard RIBA 鈥榝orm of appointment for contractor employers鈥� without making clear which clauses they found unacceptable.

He added that starting work without an agreement in place was 鈥減utting the project at risk as well as the firm鈥� 鈥� something a reasonably competent architect would never do.

Hyett was also asked what employer鈥檚 agent Artelia should have done when it saw there was no contract. He responded that it was 鈥渞esponsible for a substantial part of the administration on the part of the client, and I can鈥檛 think of anything more important in that administration process at the start than making sure that the contract鈥檚 in place鈥�.

The inquiry continues.