黑洞社区

No regrets

In 鈥淭he top 10 most disastrous building projects in the world ever鈥� (11 February, page 54), you suggest that these were projects that 鈥渆veryone involved regretted signing up for鈥�. I have to say that in my research for my book The Saga of Sydney Opera House I met nobody who felt like that. Although everyone regretted the traumas of its delivery, they were proud of their involvement in the creation of one of the great buildings of the world. The exception might have been Peter Hall, the architect who took over from J酶rn Utzon, whose career and spirit could not survive the antagonism generated by the political arguments that surrounded the project. He died, a broken man, in 1995.

The sentence 鈥渇inally, it was discovered that the concrete columns wouldn鈥檛 support the roof鈥� needs clarification. This happened early on in the project. Because of political pressures to get the job under way, and against the advice of its consultants, the New South Wales government insisted work start on site. The columns were designed and built before Utzon had completed the design of the famous roofs. When he changed from a shell structure to the ribbed version, the size of columns had to be increased - a process that involved dynamiting work that had already been carried out.

I was surprised that the opera house did not receive a few symbols for 鈥渃osts鈥� (it rose from $6m to $100m) or for 鈥渉eadaches鈥� - the structural problems stretched the architect and engineers to the limit. Utzon never sorted out the acoustics and was unable to fit in the requisite number of seats.

Credit for the last two items should go to the oft-maligned Peter Hall.

Peter Murray, Wordsearch

闯鈥檃肠肠耻蝉别

As a publication that has been vociferous about the need to improve the death rate of workers in the construction sector, can you please explain how the cost and time overruns on the top two projects in the list can be considered more important than the numerous deaths that incurred with the third-placed project, the Chateau de Versailles?

Sarah Griffiths, Hays Executive

Post-millennial tension

I was project director for the project management firm on the Millennium Stadium and find it extraordinary that you can include it in your list of the 10 most disastrous projects of all time. Yes, Laing suffered a large financial loss, but consider the following:

• The project was completed in two years, and precisely on time to host the opening ceremony of the 1999 Rugby World Cup. Perhaps you might like to reconsider the strap line you attached in your article to this project, 鈥淎 rather delayed kick off鈥�. You may also wish to compare the programme with Wembley.
• A 73,000-seat stadium (considered by most to be the finest rugby ground in the world) was built in a city centre for 拢126m, or 拢150m if you include Laing鈥檚 losses. Incidentally, this included significant demolition and property acquisition costs! Again you may wish to compare this with Wembley.
• The client鈥檚 out-turn cost was almost precisely the same as the contract sum. Can any of the other nine disastrous projects boast of this? And keep in mind that this was a 鈥渙ne-off鈥� client rather than a regular developer.
• There were exactly zero claims between client and main contractor.
• As I told the City of Manchester stadium people when they enquired about the contractor鈥檚 performance, Laing deserved massive credit for knuckling down and finishing this project despite its problems.

The project managers and client experienced the best of British contracting at work in difficult and challenging circumstances. I remember thinking a few months later that Ray O鈥橰ourke had just secured the greatest bargain of all time!

Certainly the project management team, as well as the Laing people on the project (though perhaps not the estimating department or the boardroom), see it as a glorious success. The only failure at the Millennium Stadium was the England rugby team鈥檚 in the the 2005 Six Nations!

David Barry, Precept Group