Case - William Hare v Shepherd Construction and C R Reynolds v Shepherd Construction – TCC - June 2009

Although pay-when-paid conditions have largely been outlawed under section 113 of the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, they are still valid if an employer becomes insolvent. However, as the parties in this case found, the route to that insolvency can be important.

Between October and December 2008 Shepherd Construction negotiated the subcontract with steelwork contractor William Hare for the fabrication and erection of steelwork on a large development at Trinity Walk in Wakefield. The main contract employer was Trinity Walk Wakefield.

The subcontract was based on a standard form but Shepherd had amended it, including clause 32, which defined the employer’s insolvency, specifying that the employer would be insolvent if one of four situations applied. These were: an administration order being made by the court under Part ll of the 1986 Insolvency Act; the appointment of an administrative receiver under chapters one or two of Part lll of the Act; insolvent liquidation; or the making of a winding-up order by the court. The words were similar to those in the 1996 Construction Act.

However, clause 29, which provided for the potential consequences if Hare became insolvent, was different. This said the subcontractor was insolvent if under the Insolvency Act 1986 or any amendment or re-enactment thereof (italics added) an administrator or administrative receiver was appointed.

On 2 March 2009 Hare issued its Application 5 for payment. However, on 11 March Trinity’s directors resolved to place Trinity into administration immediately.

Shepherd was an observer at that meeting and was formally told later when Trinity had filed form 2.8B (Notice of Intention to Appoint an Administrator) at court. On 19 March Trinity also filed form 2.9B (Notice of Appointment of an Administrator) and two forms 2.2B (Statement of Proposed Administration).

It meant that administrators had been appointed without any separate court order as specified in clause 32. This was a simplified process introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002 which had modified the previous acts on insolvency.

Meanwhile, Hare issued Application 6 on 25 March. On 8 April, Shepherd valued Hare’s Application 5 as £569,601.75 net and Application 6 as £427,081.60 net but withheld payments on both of these sums because Trinity was then insolvent. With nearly £1m outstanding Hare sued Shepherd.

Shepherd argued that the changes to insolvency made by the Enterprise Act meant the wording of clause 32 also had to be amended to include the new methods of entering administration that the Enterprise Act 2002 now allowed. Therefore, under the sub-contract, Trinity would be insolvent and Shepherd would be excused payment.

But the court held that this was not the case. While the Enterprise Act had introduced new methods of appointing an administrator, the old ones in clause 32 were still viable.

In addition, the Enterprise Act had been passed several years before the subcontract was agreed so the failure to amend clause 32 to reflect the Enterprise Act must have been a deliberate choice.

Shepherd’s withholding notices were invalid and it had to pay the money owed plus interest.

Ann Wright's Analysis

This case shows again the danger of messing with standard forms.
The Enterprise Act 2002 had amended and added to the processes leading to insolvency included in the 1986 Insolvency Act. However, these did not completely exclude the old processes under the original Act.

As five years had passed without changing the definition under clause 32, the parties were deemed to have known of the statutory changes to insolvency proceedings when the subcontract was formed and had decided deliberately to leave clause 32 unchanged.

The meaning Hare placed on clause 32 was plain: Trinity was not technically insolvent so Shepherd was required to pay up. However, Shepherd’s meaning required a significant rewording of the clause.
The court was required to keep Shepherd to the four corners of the agreement with Hare and not rewrite it to expand the circumstances in which it could apply.

Finally, even if clause 32 was deemed to be redrafted, any change in the wording would be very limited and would still have required a court to make an administration order against Trinity. As that did not happen Shepherd would still have lost its case.