黑洞社区

Fire engineer Exova

The report defended the role of Dr Barbara Lane, one of the experts instructed by the Inquiry.

鈥淚t was not disputed that Dr Lane is a highly qualified and very experienced fire engineer with a long and distinguished career. She provided a lengthy report for the Inquiry506 and gave evidence in person over two days.

鈥淲hile recognising her expertise, Exova argued in its closing statement on Modules 1 and 2 that she had failed to deal with the evidence accurately, fairly or in a balanced way. It said that some of her criticisms were demonstrably wrong and that some of the evidence in her report fell outside the scope of her expertise.

鈥淚t urged the Panel to treat her report with great caution and rely on it only insofar as it was necessary to do so and if the evidence was not contentious.

鈥淗er work is characterised by meticulous attention to detail and reflects a constant awareness that the responsibility of a fire engineer, particularly in relation to the design of a residential building, is the protection of human life.

鈥淗er evidence may not be beyond criticism, but in general we found her to be a thorough and reliable witness who was careful in her criticisms of Exova and was willing to modify the opinions expressed in her report after she had heard the evidence of the factual witnesses. It is also important to note that Exova did not ask us to hear evidence from a fire engineer expressing opinions that differed from those of Dr Lane.鈥�

It added: 鈥淎lthough we have considered carefully Exova鈥檚 criticisms of Dr Lane鈥檚 evidence, we do not consider that we would be justified in rejecting her evidence about the standards to be expected of a reasonably competent fire engineer in relation to the work that Exova was asked to carry out.鈥�

It then turned to Exova鈥檚 role in the refurbishment.

Exova鈥檚 work on the Grenfell Tower project fell a long way short of the standard to be expected of a reasonably competent fire engineer

鈥淚n our view Exova鈥檚 work on the Existing Fire Safety Strategy fell well below the standards to be expected of a reasonably competent fire engineer. The Existing Fire Safety Strategy ought to have provided a precise record of the baseline condition of fire safety at Grenfell Tower which could inform the refurbishment fire safety strategy.

鈥淭he failure to ensure the effective involvement of a fire engineer in the project following the appointment of Rydon as principal contractor was in our view one of the most serious flaws in the design and execution of the refurbishment.鈥�

It said Exova had an 鈥渦nprofessional approach鈥� and added: 鈥淓xova鈥檚 work on the Grenfell Tower project fell a long way short of the standard to be expected of a reasonably competent fire engineer.

鈥淚ts work was poorly resourced, casual and both incomplete and inaccurate in a number of important respects, all of which in our assessment contributed to the lack of proper attention to fire safety matters throughout the refurbishment project.

Exova鈥檚 failure to identify the significant fire safety risks introduced by the refurbishment was not only inadequate but positively dangerous

鈥淲e entirely accept that Exova was badly briefed on the project and that others, particularly Studio E, Rydon, and the TMO, failed to take a proper interest in its work.

鈥�Studio E failed to provide it with important information in a timely manner, particularly information about the overcladding of the tower. Rydon demonstrated a worrying lack of concern for fire safety, in particular. [QS, employer鈥檚 agent and CDM co-ordinator] Artelia and the TMO [Tenant Managment Organisation] also overlooked the fact that the fire safety strategy was incomplete and that no fire engineer had been appointed to complete it.

鈥淗owever, none of that can exonerate Exova. The very fact of its involvement in the project gave the design team and the TMO as the client a false sense of security and led some to believe that fire safety matters had been properly and comprehensively addressed.

鈥淓xova鈥檚 failure to identify the significant fire safety risks introduced by the refurbishment was not only inadequate but positively dangerous. In order to complete its work it should have identified the nature of the proposed rainscreen, and as a result its combustible nature, and also the unsuitability of the combustible insulation and window infill panels, as well as the absence of cavity barriers in key locations. We have therefore come to the view that Exova bears considerable responsibility for the fact that Grenfell Tower was in a dangerous condition on completion of the refurbishment.鈥�

Architect Studio E

Among the criticisms of Studio E was its opinion of expert witness, a former RIBA president Paul Hyett.

鈥淚n its closing statement Studio E suggested that Mr Hyett did not have the experience or expertise needed to express an opinion on any aspect of overcladding a high-rise building, having had little or no personal experience of such work. We were therefore asked to place little or no weight on his evidence.鈥�

But it added: 鈥淗owever, the breadth and depth of his career made him well qualified to advise on how an architectural practice should approach a project that is outside the scope of its primary expertise.

鈥淚n view of Mr Hyett鈥檚 professional experience we are satisfied that he was well qualified to give evidence about the standards that could reasonably be expected of a firm like Studio E when undertaking a new project such as the Grenfell Tower refurbishment. In general, we found his evidence to be thorough and careful, reflecting an awareness of what it was reasonable to expect from an architect in general practice. It is worth noting that Studio E did not ask us to hear evidence from someone whose opinions differed from his.鈥�

It was Studio E鈥檚 responsibility to determine whether the use of such material would enable to building to comply with regulations

Of its role in the refurbishment the report said of Studio E:

鈥淎s architect Studio E was responsible for the design of the external wall and for the choice of the materials used in its construction.

鈥淲hile the TMO wanted to reduce cost by using ACM rainscreen panels the inquiry found it was Studio E鈥檚 responsibility to determine whether the use of such material would enable to building to comply with regulations.

鈥淚ts failure to recognise that ACM was dangerous and to warn the TMO against its use represented a failure to act in accordance with the standard of a reasonably competent architect.

鈥淚t also failed to recognise that Celotex insulation was combustible and not suitable for use on a building over 18 metres in height in accordance with the statutory guidance. Studio E therefore bears a very significant degree of responsibility for the disaster.鈥�

Principal contractor Rydon

The procurement process was rerun after Leadbitter, which had been lined up for the work in 2012, failed to agree a price with the TMO.

Leadbitter decided not to tender the rerun scheme with five firms returning pre-qualification questionnaires in late 2013. Two of those firms, Wates and Keepmoat, pulled out of the process. Three firms, Rydon, Durkan and Mulalley, submitted bids in February 2014. The report said: 鈥淚t was immediately apparent that Rydon鈥檚 was significantly lower than those of the other two companies.鈥�

The report said: 鈥淎lthough Rydon鈥檚 tender was judged to be the most competitive, it still exceeded the TMO鈥檚 budget. As a result, although the TMO had received advice from its lawyers that it would be improper to do so, it entered into discussions with Rydon before the procurement process had been completed leading to an agreement that, if Rydon were awarded the contract, it would reduce its price to an acceptable level.鈥�

Rydon was appointed main contractor in March 2014 for a price of 拢9.7m although this was later amended in June that year to 拢10.3m to include a contingency.

Here is what the report said about Rydon.

鈥淩ydon failed in a number of important respects properly to perform its role as primary contractor for the Grenfell Tower refurbishment. It promised the TMO that when completed the refurbishment would comply with the 黑洞社区 Regulations, but it did not. When co-ordinating, supervising and monitoring the work it did not give sufficient importance to the safety of the building鈥檚 occupants and it displayed a casual attitude to fire safety throughout the project. As a result, Rydon bears considerable responsibility for the fire at Grenfell Tower.鈥�

The report added: 鈥淩ydon鈥檚 team working on the Grenfell Tower project were notably inexperienced.

None of Rydon鈥檚 employees had any substantive knowledge of the 黑洞社区 Regulations or of the approved documents that applied to the project

鈥淩ydon should have responded to their lack of experience by taking steps to ensure they received sufficient supervision, training and support from others with greater experience. In the event, it plainly failed to do so.

鈥淸There was] a general lack of clarity about the responsibilities that its employees were expected to shoulder, a confusion that extended beyond Rydon. In many cases staff did not recognise the descriptions of themselves that Rydon had included in its tender documents.

鈥淭hose whom Rydon employed on the project lacked even the most basic knowledge of the regulatory regime within which the refurbishment was being carried out, including the relevant statutory and industry guidance and descriptions of best practice. None of Rydon鈥檚 employees had any substantive knowledge of the 黑洞社区 Regulations or of the approved documents that applied to the project.

鈥淩ydon had no, or no effective, system for ensuring that its employees received regular training during their employment.

鈥淭he lack of knowledge and experience among Rydon鈥檚 own employees was such that it did not have a clear understanding of fire safety matters or any way of determining for itself whether the work of its sub-contractors satisfied basic fire safety standards, let alone the requirements of the 黑洞社区 Regulations. Importantly, it was in no position to know whether the right questions had been asked or to evaluate the information given to it.

鈥淎s far as fire safety was concerned, the evidence of Rydon鈥檚 witnesses showed that it was untroubled by either consideration and failed to consider even the simplest questions relating to the design of the facade from the point of view of fire safety.

鈥淎lthough Rydon was of course entitled to expect its sub-contractors to carry out their work competently and in accordance with their own contractual obligations, that did not relieve it of its responsibility to the TMO for the quality of their work, nor did it relieve it of its responsibility to co-ordinate and supervise their work. Rydon was not aware of any of the questions that needed to be considered as part of the design process and so failed to exercise the degree of supervision that we consider was required.

鈥淎lthough Rydon relied entirely on its sub-contractors and consultants to perform its own contractual obligations to the TMO, it made no serious effort to find out whether the bodies it proposed to engage for that purpose were competent.

鈥淎s principal contractor it was Rydon鈥檚 responsibility to ensure that sufficient expertise and resources were made available to the project and that the work carried out by external consultants, such as Exova, was satisfactory. In the event, Rydon鈥檚 approach to Exova, and to fire engineering generally, was alarmingly complacent. Rydon appears to have had no interest in the use of a fire engineer on the Grenfell Tower project

鈥淩ydon was responsible for inspecting the work done by Harley and other sub-contractors at Grenfell Tower but the inspections it carried out were inadequate because they failed to detect some serious defects in workmanship, particularly in relation to cavity barriers.

鈥淩ydon accepted that the quality of workmanship in those cases was very poor but could not explain how it had failed to detect it. In substance, Rydon鈥檚 employees appeared to have regarded its quality control process as little more than a snagging inspection, but that fell far short of performing its obligation to ensure that the work had been properly carried out.

鈥淚t is also clear that the quality of Rydon鈥檚 work and its approach to the project more generally was poor. From mid-2015, when the project was nearing completion, the TMO and Artelia repeatedly raised concerns with Rydon about the resources it had dedicated to the project and its apparent inability or unwillingness to resolve complaints about the quality of the work.

鈥淚n June 2015, [Rydon] had a poorly performing site, mainly the result of poor surveying and cheap, incompetent sub-contractors. [Witness] statements reflect a contemporaneous perception, supported by other evidence before us, that the general quality of Rydon鈥檚 work fell significantly below that which could be expected of a reasonably competent design and build contractor.鈥�

Cladding contractor Harley

The report states: 鈥淔or present purposes it is sufficient to say that Harley was contractually responsible to Rydon for all aspects of the design and construction of the facade of Grenfell Tower, including the cladding, insulation, window frames, window infill panels, glazing and cavity barriers.鈥�

Here is what the report said about Harley.

鈥淲e consider that Harley鈥檚 work on the refurbishment was characterised by a failure to take its responsibilities seriously, ignorance, complacency and a failure properly to manage its staff.

The standard of Harley鈥檚 work fell well below that to be expected of a reasonably competent cladding contractor

鈥淎s the specialist contractor responsible for the external wall of the tower, the standard of Harley鈥檚 work fell well below that to be expected of a reasonably competent cladding contractor and it must therefore bear a significant degree of responsibility for the fire.

鈥淲e are satisfied that Harley failed to achieve the standard of a reasonably competent cladding contractor in several different aspects of its work. Many of those failures had the same root cause, namely, the inadequate technical expertise of its employees and representatives.

鈥淚t is clear from the evidence that none of those employed by Harley on the refurbishment had even a basic grasp of the fire testing regime that applied to the products used in the external wall of the tower.

鈥淣one of Harley鈥檚 staff involved in the refurbishment were aware of the many fires overseas involving ACM PE cladding, although they were well known within the cladding industry. We are satisfied that a reasonably competent contractor in Harley鈥檚 position would have been aware of them and would have had them in mind when considering the suitability of ACM for Grenfell Tower.

鈥淗arley鈥檚 striking lack of technical knowledge and its failure to implement any proper system to monitor and improve it fell far short of the standard of a reasonably competent cladding contractor. That fundamental failure was the cause of much of its inadequate work on the refurbishment.鈥�