黑洞社区

鈥淚t was a very busy place鈥� was how Philip Clark, former burn hall manager at the 黑洞社区 Research Establishment (BRE), described his workplace when challenged at the Grenfell Inquiry this week about a string of errors made during fire testing.

鈥淲e could have 10 people in on any given day,鈥� he said, adding: 鈥淚t wasn鈥檛 the position that we were there every single minute checking everything that the client did minute to minute.鈥�

In this allegedly busy environment, Clark said he had failed to notice in May 2014 that a test rig for an insulation product from manufacturer Celotex had been secretly altered to increase its chances of passing.

Cement boards attached to Celotex鈥檚 RS5000 insulation, which were later installed on Grenfell Tower, had been thickened to 12mm following an earlier failed test in February 2014, which had used 8mm cement panels.

But in two places on the test rig, the cement boards were still 8mm thick. This was because they covered two 6mm boards of fire-resistant magnesium oxide, which had been put there to reduce the impact of the flames on the insulation.

After the test passed, the magnesium boards were not mentioned in either the BRE鈥檚 official test report or Celotex鈥檚 marketing literature for the insulation.

Two Celotex witnesses, former technical services officer Jamie Hayes and former assistant product manager Jonathan Roper, had previously told the inquiry that Clark had known about the extra magnesium oxide boards.

Clark denied being aware of the magnesium boards, telling Tuesday鈥檚 hearing: 鈥淚 would have reported it. And had I known it, I would have stopped the test.鈥�

Although the magnesium boards went unlogged, Clark鈥檚 signature was on a delivery note for the thinner 8mm cement panels despite his claim that he thought all of the boards were of the same thickness.

He claimed that he had made the error because the burn hall had been so busy. 

 The central theme of this week鈥檚 scrutiny of the evidence provided by Clark was around the degree to which he could have been complicit in Celotex鈥檚 efforts to falsify the test of its RS5000 insulation to ensure a pass.

Clark was also involved in talks with Kingspan about testing of its K15 insulation, another product used in Grenfell Tower鈥檚 refurbishment. 

Clark claimed that manufacturers could 鈥渟neak鈥� extra components onto test rigs without inspectors knowing.

鈥淲e weren鈥檛 there 24/7. We didn鈥檛 have a security guard on the door,鈥� he said, adding: 鈥渢he reliance was very much on the honesty of the client鈥�.

Asked by counsel to the inquiry Richard Millett QC if this meant that Clark was not always sure of the precise make-up of the rig being tested, Clark replied: 鈥淚 wouldn鈥檛 say necessarily, no, but if you鈥檝e got somebody who鈥檚 going out of their way to deceive, then there was a possibility they could do that, if that was their intention.鈥�

Clark said that it was not the BRE鈥檚 job to 鈥減olice necessarily to the nth degree鈥� how the rig was being built, adding: 鈥淭here鈥檚 a large element of trust in everything we do.鈥�

And even if Celotex had managed to smuggle the magnesium boards onto the test rig unnoticed, Clark claimed that he had still failed to notice both the different thicknesses of cement board that he had signed off, and two ruby-coloured bands on the rig holding the magnesium boards in place.

Millett challeged this version of events, asking: 鈥淚sn鈥檛 the reality that you knew very well that there was a 6mm magnesium oxide layer behind it? 

鈥淵ou were in charge of this test, the photographs showed it was there, the deputy knew it was there, as they must have done, it would have taken time to put up and it was covered over by a perfectly obvious ruby-coloured band in two places of a material of a different thickness. 

鈥淪urely you must have realised what was behind it?鈥�

Clark said that his failure to spot the boards had been 鈥減laying in my mind for a long time.鈥�

鈥淚 would have returned to the burn hall the day before the test and would be running around instrumenting and all that sort of thing, and to this day I still can鈥檛 think why I missed it,鈥� he said, adding: 鈥淣o, I can鈥檛 account for that at all.鈥�

But the following day the inquiry was shown video footage filmed from Clark鈥檚 helmet camera in the burn hall during the May 2014 test in which he told former Celotex assistant product manager Jonathan Roper: 鈥淪ee how that flame seems to have ceased now that the board is there because you鈥檙e losing a lot of the energy from behind it. 

鈥淭he other thing as well is it鈥檚 something that鈥檚 quite big behind the board [because] it extends the flame vents.鈥�

Asked by inquiry chairman Sir Martin Moore-Bick why he had said 鈥渘ow that the board is there,鈥� Clark said: 鈥淚 don鈥檛 know, it鈥檚 just speaking - a general conversation.鈥�

And he said when he had talked about something behind the board he had been referring to flames.

In another exchange captured in the footage, Clark had said 鈥淪ometimes changing two things at a time doesn鈥檛 always give you an advantage.鈥� 

Millett suggested this had referred to the two changes in the test - the magnesium boards and the thicker 12mm cement panels.

But Clark denied he knew two things had changed in the construction of the wall being tested and said he was only referring to 鈥渢he scientific principle that if you change two key items, two key variables, you don鈥檛 know which one has had a positive effect.鈥�

Clark was also questioned about the BRE鈥檚 testing of Kingspan鈥檚 K15 insulation after it emerged that flames in a 2005 test had been mistakenly recorded as spreading half as fast as they actually had.

Due to a typo in a BRE document, it was stated that flames in the test took 10 minutes to climb four metres up the K15 rig. It actually took five minutes.

The error occurred after data was taken from the wrong column in notes of the test, with the correct timing only logged in the test鈥檚 original hand-written notes.

The mistaken value was then repeated through all of the test data from that point onward.

Clark told the hearing that the error 鈥渟hould have been corrected,鈥� adding that he had only become aware of the mistake during the course of the inquiry last year.

And in a further embarrassment for the testing house, it was revealed on Thursday that Roper - the former Celotex assistant product manager - had warned the BRE about Kingspan鈥檚 misuse of its successful BS 8414 test for K15 four years before the Grenfell fire.

In an email exchange shown to the inquiry, Roper appeared to have alerted BRE business group manager Stephen Howard that Kingspan, Celotex鈥檚 competitor in the insulation market, had been selling K15 on a wide variety of external wall systems not covered by the test.

鈥淭his product is used in buildings above 18m using a wide variety of constructions, some on to masonry, some on to steel frame with ACM panel cladding, terracotta etc,鈥� Roper wrote.

He added: 鈥淲e are [surprised] that they feel confident enough to allow their product to be used in buildings their fire test doesn鈥檛 cover, unless they have a report to say other.鈥�

Despite the warning, Howard did not take any action internally with the BRE on Kingspan鈥檚 use of the insulation as he said Roper had not provided further information of how the product was being misused.

K15 - like Celotex鈥檚 RS5000 - was later found to be included in the cladding system used on the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower, which has been blamed for contributing to the June 2017 fire which killed 72 people.

Next week the inquiry will hear more evidence from Howard, along with evidence from contractor Simco and Herefordshire 黑洞社区 Control.

The inquiry continues.